Abstract: Many authors discovered that simple forms of technical analysis possessed significant forecast power on various market indexes. We show that these results can be replicated on formally selected European indexes, which almost completely eliminates any influence from data-snooping. Implications of these results in terms of market efficiency are also discussed.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
In section 2, we briefly present the selection methodology we used to choose the samples on which we tested the technical rules, and the technical rules we tested on the samples.
The samples and rules are also presented. Section 3 displays and explains the basic empirical results. Section 4 tries to check whether the basic results are robust to page 5/25 5 nonsynchronous trading and other problems regarding the data and rules we used.
Section 4 gives an interpretation in terms of market efficiency and underlines the importance of the results for the relevancy of technical methods in an efficient market.
Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes.
II.
Technical rules and data
1) Technical rules
We chose to evaluate the 10 VMA (variable length moving averages) rules of BLL. Those rules consist of comparing a short moving average of the price with a long moving average. When the short moving average (over 1, 2 or 5 days) is above the long moving average (over 50, 150 or 200 days) plus a certain percentage band, the next day is considered as a buy day. Conversely, when the short average is below the long average minus the band, the next day is classified as a sell day.
Following BLL, we evaluate the following VMA: (1,50,0), (1, 150, 0) , (5, 150, 0) , (1, 200, 0) , (2, 200, 0) , (1,50,0.01) , (1,150,0.01), (5,150,0.01) , (1,200,0.01) , (2,200,0.01) , where the first and second figure represent the number of days over which the short and long moving averages are computed, respectively, and where the third figure is the value of the band.
The reason why we chose to evaluate only VMA rules (and not the FMA, fixed length moving averages, nor TRB, trading range break-out) is because the results obtained by VMA rules in BLL were much more significant (see the p-values related to the VMA, FMA and TRB on page 1750). This fact has been confirmed by other studies, so we have good a priori reason to prefer VMA rules.
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2) Data
We chose to evaluate the forecast power of technical rules on European indexes, using daily data, to replicate BLL.
Instead of arbitrarily choosing one index, as Hudson et al. (1996) , we preferred testing our 10 rules on all 15 countries of the European Union. Again, this reduces the potential data-snooping bias as we avoid presenting to the reader the results on only one index.
Once this decision taken, we had to choose the indexes. One possibility would have been to choose " market " indexes, as BLL with the Dow-Jones. The problem with this approach is that there are many " market " indexes in each countries. For instance, in Britain, do we have to choose the Footsie 100, or the Footsie 30 ? Another problem is that market indexes are the ones that are the most studied by researchers, so they may have been used to filter the most ex-post effective technical rules. For these reasons, we chose to select the indexes according to the following formal procedure:
• In datastream, on the index page, we selected all the indexes beginning with the name of the country (in English).
• Then, we selected the index for which the records begin the most early.
• When several indexes start at the same date, we simply chose the first in alphabetical order.
This procedure ensures that only one index is selected per country 2 . The criterion of the starting date is important, because, as Hudson et al. (1996) notice, long periods need to be considered for the results to be statistically significant 3 .
page 7/25 7
In table 1, we present the 15 selected indexes with some of their characteristics. When the indexes are still "alive" now, we only downloaded the series up to the 1/1/1999.
A few more remarks should be made: we chose to work on "raw" indexes, i.e. as they were available on datastream. The databases are such that even on days where the index is not quoted (except on the week-ends), the price of the previous day is used (for instance, on 25 December or on 1 January of each year). We do not expect this problem to bias our results, so we did not attempt to filter the data one way or the other. On the other hand, for some indexes, the price changes infrequently at the beginning of the sample (it sometimes remains the same for more than 20 days). We guess that the data were not always available, and that "holes" have been filled with the last data available.
The only indexes for which the problem exists are the indexes for Austria, Denmark, France and United Kingdom; this problem is more serious and could potentially affect our results. To remedy this, we will split the samples in two equal subperiods, and see if our results remain the same.
At last, it should be noted that the selected indexes are often aeronautic or banking indexes, as those sectors are often first in alphabetical order. We do not see any reason why this should bias our results.
page 8/25 8 We begin our description of the results with the first line of table 2, i.e. the results for the index from Austria. The first column, labeled "buy", represents the mean daily return following a day classified as "buy". In reality, this mean buy return is an average of the 10 mean buy returns across the 10 trading rules. This average mean buy return is 0.086%, which is about 24% at an annual rate. This compares to the unconditional daily return of 0.0186% (in table 1), or 4.8% at an annual rate. The p-value in brackets indicates that none of the 1000 simulations gave such a high average mean buy return. The average mean buy return can also be compared to the average mean sell return of -0.03678%
(-8.85% at an annual rate). This is done in column 3: the difference between the buy and the sell return is 0.12%, more than 36% at an annual rate ! Again, none of the simulations showed such a high difference between buy and sell returns. Maybe this difference can be explained by increased volatility during buy periods. In column 4, the p-value of 0.943
indicates that in most of the simulations (943 out of 1000) the buy volatility was higher than the buy volatility observed in the original index. And column 7 shows that in only 4 simulations the mean buy volatility was lower than the unconditional volatility. Thus, it appears that volatility was higher during buy periods, and this could explain the higher return observed during buy periods. Column 8 shows that the sell volatility was higher than the unconditional volatility (what we call a favorable outcome, because the technical trader is not in the market) in 603 simulations. So the sell volatility is higher than the unconditional volatility. Although this result is not statistically significant, it is sufficient to say that the lower (more negative) return observed during sell periods cannot be explained by lower risk. In fact, column 9 shows that risk (or rather its proxy, the standard deviation) cannot explain the difference between buy return and unconditional return. Indeed, in no one of the 1000 simulations was the ratio 5 'buy return/buy standard deviation' as high as in the original series. Thus, the higher buy volatility cannot fully explain the higher returns observed after buy signals. These results for the Austrian support the study of BLL as far as the conditional returns are concerned. But the volatility results are different: on the Dow-Jones index, the buy volatility was lower than the unconditional (and sell) volatility (BLL, 1992 ).
The last column shows the one way break-even trading costs associated with the 10 VMA rules. These costs (C p ) simply represent the level of transaction costs that would just have eliminated all technical profit in excess of the buy and hold strategy. They are computed as in Bessembinder and Chan (1998) : 5 Using these sorts of Sharpe ratios (column 9 and 10) in conjunction with the bootstrap allows us to easily correct for risk.
For the Austrian index, a trader that would have had to pay less than 1.78% of trading costs per transaction over the period would have been better off using the set of trading rules than simply buying and holding the index.
We let the reader examine the results for the other indexes. It can be noted that the results are similar for most of them. The buy-sell return is always positive, except for
France and Spain, where this difference is negative (but not significantly), meaning that the returns following sell signals were higher than returns following buy signals. Except for these two indexes, the technical rules seem to perform well as far as the prediction of returns is concerned. And although the results for Finland and Germany may be due to chance, in all of the 11 remaining cases they are significant at the 95% confidence level.
Adjusting for risk (columns 9 and 10) only changes the results for Greece: because the rules classify as "buy" the most risky periods, the ratios 'buy returns/buy standard deviation' and 'sell returns/sell standard deviation' do not appear statistically different in the simulations and in the index. For Portugal and Luxemburg, one of those ratios is not anymore significantly different in the simulations to what it is in the original series, while the other remains significant. In fact, we can note that the rules predict the volatility correctly in 11 cases out of 15 (considering column 6). It predicts the volatility incorrectly in the remaining 4 cases, and only significantly for Greece.
Looking at the last column, it can be noted that break-even costs are only negative for France and Spain. This is logical, since on those two indexes the 10 rules were wrong in predicting the buy and sell periods. The traders should have been paid about 0.3% per trade for the set of rules to outperform the buy and hold strategy. Apart from these two cases, break-even costs appear to be positive. And, except for Germany (0.3%), they lie between 0.63% (Portugal) and 3.34% (Luxemburg). We don't know precisely about the real trading costs in these different countries during those periods, but they probably also lied in this range for most traders. 
IV. Sensitivity tests

1) Nonsynchronous trading
The predictive power observed is undoubtedly strong. But it could be fallacious. Indeed,
the technical rules that are tested rely on the continuations of movements: the crossing of the two moving averages is supposed to generate some trend that is likely to continue until the short moving average crosses the long average from the opposite sense. The problem when we try to test the predictive power of such rules on a portfolio (or an index) is called "nonsynchronous trading": Scholes and Williams (1977) show that if the securities making up the portfolio are not traded simultaneously, then positive serial correlation in the portfolio returns are likely to be observed. Indeed, news that potentially affects all the stocks of the portfolio may affect the stocks making up the portfolio at different dates, depending on the first trade after the news is released.
To check for the effect of nonsynchronous trading, we have to introduce a lag of a certain period between the moment when the signal is generated and the moment when the position is actually taken. If the stocks making up our indexes trade every day, then a one-day lag would be enough. Using this correction on the Dow-Jones Index, where stocks are heavily traded, Chan (1995, 1998) show that the predictive power of technical rules diminishes 7 , but is still largely significant.
The problems with this approach in our case is that we do not have enough information on the composition of our indexes to know whether the stocks were traded every day. In other words, we cannot be sure that a one day lag will be long enough to correct for the effects of nonsynchronous trading. This is why we chose to introduce a longer lag. In fact, we will use a lag ranging from 0 to 10 days for each index (it seems to be a reasonable assumption that each stock has been traded at least every 10 days). We will then assess the performance of our 10 rules on the base of the break-even trading costs.
The higher those costs, the better the predictive power. So, if we see that the break-even costs diminish as we introduce lags, and appear to be equal to 0 (or less) after one, two or more days, we can conclude that nonsynchronous trading may have played an important role in the predictive power of the 10 VMA rules.
In table 3, we present the results for each index. Graph 1 illustrates the figures for the 3 indexes that have the highest break-even costs before any correction for nonsynchronous trading. Table 3 : Introducing lags
The table shows the break-even trading costs associated with the set of 10 rules for each index. Lag x means that a trading lag of x days has been introduced between the signal date and the actual trading date. As can be readily seen, the predictive power of the 10 VMA's indeed tend to decrease as we add days in the trade lag. Nonsynchronous trading may thus be responsible for part of it. But two remarks should be made. Firstly, the decrease is not uniform: for some countries (Luxemburg, Germany and Italy) the predictive power first tend to increase with the number of lag days (from 0 to 1 day). Although this result is probably not significant, it is in sharp contrast with the non synchronous trading explanation, that does not seem to hold for those indexes. Most importantly, the decrease in the predictive power is generally small, and even after 10 days, the VMA's can still predict the indexes movements. For instance, the break-even transaction costs remain above 3% for on the index from Luxemburg. Thus, even if nonsynchronous trading has played a role, it is certainly not all the story.
2) Missing data
The second problem we want to address concerns the indexes from Austria, Denmark, France and United Kingdom. As outlined earlier, the data for those indexes seem incomplete: in the first part of the samples, the same price sometimes appear for more that 10 days, as if the "wholes" had been filled with the preceeding data. The autocorrelation induced may have played in favor of the predictive power of the VMA, that exploit some kind of nonlinear autocorrelation.
To check this, we simply splitted the samples in two equal subperiods. Then we tested the 10 rules on those separate samples. We only present the criterion of the break-even costs, for reason of simplicity. Table 4 shows the results obtained: It is easy to see that, except for France that had negative results in the first and second subperiods (worse in the second subperiods), the 10 VMA rules perform better on the second subperiod, indicating that the autocorrelation present in the first subperiod (due to the lack of data) does not artificially improve our results. It makes them worse.
V. Interpretation
Briefly stated, our results strongly support the conclusions of BLL as for the predictive ability of moving averages rules. Having selected the samples and the rules formally, we can say fairly confidently that this predictive power is real.
But what are the implications in terms of market efficiency ? On most markets, breakeven costs do not appear sufficiently high to ensure even to professional traders an excess return. This fact confirms the conclusions of other studies (see for instance Hudson et al. (1996) or Chan (1995,1998) In more practical terms, the contribution of technical analysis to efficiency implies that important financial institutions, especially in small markets, must carry on using technical analysis even if the market is efficient. Indeed, if one such institution were to lay off all their teams of technical analysts, the market could become less efficient, a fact from which competitors could profit. In fact, the use of financial analysis in an efficient market could be seen as the result of a strategic equilibrium in an attrition war type game.
Modeling this game would be an interesting study, and we leave it for further research.
VI. Summary and conclusion
Our study tried to check whether BLL's results could be replicated on a series of formally selected European indexes. The technical rules we chose to test are the VMA rules presented in BLL, that seemed to perform particularly well on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, on the Footsie 30 and on a variety of Asian indexes.
We find that in 13 cases out of 15, the VMA rules possess some predictive ability in the sense that the returns following buy signals are higher than returns following sell signals.
Only for the indexes from France and Spain is this not the case. In 11 cases this predictive power is statistically significant, and in 10 cases this result is robust to risk adjustment. As far as the volatility results are concerned, our study tends to confirm BLL's results, although not as strongly: in 9 cases, technical rules can significantly select less risky periods (column 6 in to under or overreact to information in some systematic manner. In our study, testing technical rules on daily series, we think the second explanation is the most likely, whereas the first explanation would be more relevant in intra-day.
This is why we believe that the cause of the predictive power of simple forms of technical analysis has to be found in the area of behavioral finance, market psychology, and all branches that do not assume the perfect rationality of markets.
